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TALK OF LAW:
CONTESTED AND CONVENTIONAL LEGALITY
Susan S. Silbey*
INTRODUCTION
From February 8, 2006 to February 11, 2006, the Boston Globe car-
ried numerous articles, editorials, and letters about a six-year-old boy
in the Brockton, Massachusetts public schools who had been sus-
pended from kindergarten for three days for sexually harassing an-
other child in his classroom. The young boy had put his hand in the
elastic of his classmate's pants, touching the skin on her back. After
the principal reported the incident, the school superintendent for-
warded the case to the Plymouth County district attorney's office.
The prosecutors refused to bring charges, however, because the Com-
monwealth's juvenile criminal laws do not apply to children under
seven.
The story was quickly picked up by the Associated Press and re-
ported in news outlets across the continent, including the Wall Street
Journal, the New York Daily News, the Ottawa Citizen, and the Cal-
gary Herald. The story erupted in the news media nine days after the
suspension had taken place because the mother, Berthena Dorinvil,
refused to allow her son to return to school. Mrs. Dorinvil requested
that her son be moved to another elementary school in the district,
because she feared that "he would be treated differently" at his old
school and would be "stigmatized by the incident."'2
Within two days of the news blitz, and twelve days after the suspen-
sion, the Brockton School Department apologized for suspending the
* Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I am
particularly grateful for the extensive research support from Ayn Cavicchi as well as critical
suggestions by the participants in the Twelfth Annual Clifford Symposium and the editors of the
DePaul Law Review. The conception of a multiplaited legality derives from a ten-year collabo-
ration with Patricia Ewick appearing in The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life.
For a more recent article, see Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & Soc.
Sci. 323 (2005). Errors and misjudgments that remain are the product of my own limitations.
1. Massachusetts law defines a "delinquent child" as "a child between seven and seventeen
who violates any city ordinance or town by-law or who commits any offence against a law of the
commonwealth." MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 52 (West 2003).
2. Ralph Ranalli & Raja Mishra, Boy's Suspension in Harassment Case Outrages Mother, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2006, at Al.
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boy. The next day, his "parents hired a lawyer to investigate the
school system's handling of the matter."' 3 More than two weeks after
the suspension, the story continued to generate activity in local and
national media across the political spectrum-from TalkLeft: The
Politics of Crime to World Christian News to the Massachusetts GOP
News.4 On March 8, one month after the story first made the news, "a
Brockton Superior Court judge ordered the city to provide the par-
ents of the boy 'immediate access' to his school records."'5 During the
six weeks following the boy's suspension, the school system had pro-
vided the parents with "only the boy's health record and report
card."' 6 After the court ordered the release of school documents, Mrs.
Dorinvil reportedly stated that, at the time of the suspension, her six-
year-old had been "told to sign a paper on which the principal had
written an account of the incident."7
The school system has transferred the boy to another school, where
he is reportedly happy.8 It also began revising its system of reporting
student conduct to better address inappropriate touching among
young children; it would presumably no longer be labeled as sexual
harassment. 9 In addition, legislators at the state capitol discussed the
case during debate on a bill that would require sex education for chil-
dren as young as pre-kindergarten. 10 "This incident is a teachable mo-
ment for everyone concerned with young children," said
Representative Geraldine Creedon, a member of the Massachusetts
Education Committee. 1 The outcome of the legislative discussion is
not yet clear, nor is it clear whether the family will file suit against the
school system.
This story illustrates the deeply layered and textured meaning of the
rule of law in popular culture and understanding. Rather than a sim-
3. Tracy Jan, In Brockton, Boy's Parents Hire Lawyer: School System Apologizes, to Alter
Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2006, at BI.
4. See, e.g., Don't Shake Hands with Brockton School Principal Diane Gosselin, Massachu-
setts GOP News & Views Blog, http://gopnews.blog.com/548249 (Feb. 8, 2006, 00:44 EST).
5. Maria Papadopoulos, Parents of Brockton First-Grader Wrongly Accused of Sexual Harass-
ment Win Court Approval to See the Records in the Case, ENTERPRISE (Brockton), Mar. 9, 2006,
available at http://enterprise.southofboston.com/articles/2006/03/09/news/news/news0l.txt.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Jan, supra note 3.
9. Maria Papadopoulos & Terence J. Downing, Touchy Subject, ENTERPRISE (Brockton), Feb.
11, 2006, available at http://enterprise.southofboston.com/articlesl2006/02/11/news/news/news0l.
txt.
10. Maria Papadopoulos, Schools to Revise Harassment Policy, ENTERPRISE (Brockton), Feb.
10, 2006, available at http://enterprise.southofboston.com/articles/2006/02/10/news/news/news0l.
txt.
11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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pie or singular phenomenon-a book that can be placed on a shelf to
be consulted when needed-the rule of law actually lives in the myr-
iad practices and contradictory aspirations of a people. Neither en-
tirely a set of disinterested rules and rational procedures for confining
arbitrary power,12 nor merely a terrain of unregulated, agonistic en-
gagement, 13 the rule of law is an ambivalent, paradoxical phenomena
that is a commonplace feature of everyday life in the United States.
Its ambiguous, knotty constitution sustains, rather than undermines,
its durability and its power to shape social relations.
In a recent essay rethinking Professor Robert Cover's Nomos and
Narrative,t 4 Professor Judith Resnik echoes this understanding of the
rule of law when she claims that the nation's citizens "live law's mean-
ing."'15 Although "in general, judges pronounce the meaning of law,"
she writes, they "do not have to enact those meanings by themselves
engaging in the activity that they require-by living the law that they
make." 16
Resnik, like Cover, focuses primarily on the jurisgenerative work of
the few centuries-old communities that have "sustained remarkably
distinct legal regimes across time, place, and enormous" socio-political
and economic changes. 17 Resnik and Cover argue that these "commu-
nities [are] instructive because they show[ ] that the creation of endur-
ing legal meaning require[s] action, not just words."' 8 Members of
these communities do not merely pronounce law, as judges do, they
exemplify the process of "living their law."' 19 Judges, and most citi-
zens, are "able to state their understanding of law without facing tests
of their commitment to the principles they elaborated." 20 But Men-
nonites, devout Muslims and Jews, or the orthodox Baptists Professor
Carol Greenhouse wrote about in Praying for Justice,2 1 are not always
able to do so. When conflicts arise between the law of the state and
the core beliefs of these communities, members are forced "either to
12. See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Philip
Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NAT. L. FORUM 84 (1961).
13. Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978).
14. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
15. Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Rob-
ert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 18 (2005).
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Cover, supra note 14, at 49).
20. Id.
21. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND COMMUNITY IN AN
AMERICAN TOWN (1986).
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reaffirm or to abandon a set of core beliefs and, if reaffirming, either
to suffer persecution or to migrate. '22
Cover feared-and history may yet prove him right-that "[t]he
universalist virtues that we have come to identify with modern liber-
alism, the broad principles of our law," procedural justice, and due
process considerations, would turn out to be "system-maintaining
'weak' forces."' 23 Liberal relativism and procedural justice would
eventually, he predicted, erode commitments to the rule of law. 24 The
strong forces supporting a durable rule of law derive not from easily
assented-to rules of procedure, but from more deeply sedimented
habits, conventions, and ways of being in the world.
How do Americans live their law? When Americans talk about
law, what are they referring to? What does the rule of law mean to
ordinary Americans? In their classic account of how to study the
"law-stuff of a culture," Professors Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson
Hoebe12 5 laid out three investigatory paths to mapping "legal culture"
or "legal consciousness. ' 26 The first path was ideological and traced
the extant rules of social control for channeling and controlling behav-
ior.27 In this path, the scholar tries to map the official, formal norms
of a society, those rules of right behavior which individuals-as dis-
tinct from the official organs of the community-no longer retain au-
thority to define. This is the traditional task of the legal academic.
The second path of legal inquiry "explore[d] the patterns according to
which behavior actually occurs."'2 8 This became the standard model of
law and society research for several generations.2 9 Finally, Llewellyn
and Hoebel urged a third path that looks at "instances of hitch, dis-
pute, grievance, [and] trouble;" it inquires "what the trouble was and
what was done about it."'30 This Article follows the third path, al-
22. Resnik, supra note 15, at 29.
23. Id. at 30 (alteration in original) (quoting Cover, supra note 14, at 12).
24. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF
COMMUNITY (1992).
25. K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE
LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1941).
26. See generally S.S. Silbey, Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness, in 13 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8623 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B.
Baltes eds., 2001).
27. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 25, at 20-21.
28. Id. at 21.
29. See, e.g., THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER (Richard L. Abel ed., 1995); LAW AND SOCIETY:
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 1995); JOHN R. SUT-
TON, LAw/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE (2001).
30. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 25, at 21.
[Vol. 56:639
CONTESTED LEGALITY
though it is obvious that in any complete investigation of legal culture
the three paths are intertwined:
[I]t is rare in a ... group or society that the "norms" which are felt
or known as the proper ones to control behavior are not made in
the image of at least some of the actually prevalent behavior; and it
is rare, on the other hand, that [the norms] do not to some extent
become active in their turn and aid in patterning behavior further.3'
Norms build up over time with amazing emotional and material
power, often attaching moral meanings to what may have originally
been accident or convenience. Llewllyn and Hoebel explain that in-
stances of hitch and trouble, as both moments of deviation and as
grounds for repair, lay bare a community's norms.32 What was latent
is made manifest, and what appeared consensual is the subject of
open, explicit contest. By following what, in a different register,
Cover and Resnik call jurispotent conflicts, 33 we may be able to trace
the threads of legality that compose the rule of law.
Following the models of trouble cases and jurispotent conflicts, this
Article revisits the case of the six-year-old suspended for sexual har-
assment. Part II traces the lines of interpretation that emerged in the
public media to identify the diverse conceptions of law circulating in
American society. Part III analyzes how, as an ensemble rather than
discrete distinguishable threads, this collection of legal narratives
works to constitute a hegemonic legal consciousness, or what we
might call the rule of law. Part IV concludes with a different
"trouble" case that has also occupied the press in Massachusetts and
elsewhere: the local convention of reserving-with milk crates, chairs,
or other physical objects-shoveled-out parking spots on public
streets. In this movement from the six-year-old sexual harasser to the
claims of property on public streets, I hope to show the variety of
ways in which legality and the rule of law are performed in American
culture, and the difference between contested, ideological law and
conventional, hegemonic law.
II. CONTESTED LEGALITY
The following reactions are pulled from the news accounts of the
Brockton incident. They display Americans' complex appreciation
and enactment of the rule of law.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Resnik, supra note 15, at 25 n.37. Resnik mentions that Cover is more often cited for the
terms "jurisgenerative" and "jurispathic" than "jurispotent." Resnik more often uses the term
jurisgenerative in her interpretation of Cover's work, see id. at 26, 28, 34, 40, 42, 47, 48, 53
(referring to Cover, supra note 14).
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A. "Educators Overreact, but Charge Deserved Attention. ", 34
Start with the school administrators. Why would any reasonable
adult report a six-year-old who puts his hands in another child's waist-
band-touching only skin on the back-for suspension, let alone crim-
inal prosecution? According to the school officials, the law demanded
their action; they were following legal mandates. "This was done right
by the book," said Cynthia McNally, a district spokesperson with
whom I spoke and whose comments were reported in the media, it
"was thoroughly investigated. '35 "It's a situation within the parame-
ters [of sexual harassment], and we're dealing with it within the pa-
rameters," she said.36 The Brockton School System has a six-step
process for reporting and investigating sexual harassment allega-
tions.37 The policy requires a written account of the alleged harass-
ment submitted by the accuser and a meeting between the alleged
harasser and a principal or other school administrator. The Brockton
School System was acting in accord with the mandate of the Massa-
chusetts Department of Education, which requires every school to de-
velop a nondiscrimination policy that covers harassment and
bullying. 38 In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Su-
preme Court assigned responsibility and financial liability to school
systems that fail to take action against harassment. 39 Although many
school systems adopted policies on harassment prior to 1999, nearly
every system in the nation adopted these policies after Davis.4 0 The
Boston Globe noted that "[c]ities and towns are liable if their school
departments fail to take action against incidents of sexual
harassment. "41
34. Marilyn Hancock, Educators Overreact, but Charge Deserved Attention, ENTERPRISE
(Brockton), Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://enterprise.southofboston.com/articles/2006/02/12/
news/news/news02.txt.
35. Ranalli & Mishra, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Laura Crimaldi & Casey Ross, Boy, 6, Hit with Sex Harass Rap, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 8,
2006, at 6.
38. Id.
39. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
40. Jodi L. Short, Creating Peer Sexual Harassment: Mobilizing Schools to Throw the Book at
Themselves, 28 LAW & POL'Y 31, 41 (2006).
41. Editorial, Brockton Overreaction, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2006, at A10; see also DouG-
LAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 291 (2d ed. 2003) ("Over time other professionals, such as teachers and social work-
ers, also became 'mandated reporters."'); Alexa Irene Pearson, Eulogies, Effigies, and Errone-
ous Interpretations: Comparing Missouri's Child Protection System to Federal Law, 69 Mo. L.
REV. 589, 591-92 (2004) ("Although the federal legislation provides some standards for defining
and reporting abuse, state laws vary. States differ as to who is required to report ... suspicions
of child abuse or neglect." (citation omitted)).
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These interpretations of what federal and state law demanded were
not limited to the Brockton officials. Antonio Barbosa, principal of
the F. Lyman Winship Elementary School in Boston, said that chil-
dren at his school are taught to "keep one another at arms' length and
to use words, rather than to touch. '42 Barbosa claimed that he fol-
lowed the school "system's six-page sexual harassment policy and that
[the school] would treat all incidents seriously," although he could not
"recall an instance of a young child sexually harassing a peer. ' 43 The
Boston school policy calls for student suspension or expulsion for har-
assment, defined as "inappropriate touching, massages, catcalls,
whistles, patting, squeezing, or spanking." 44 "We take these things ex-
tremely [seriously] these days," Barbosa said, "whereas years ago,
people might not have thought of touching as having a sexual conno-
tation .... We want to make sure children respect one another and
that they don't get in each other's personal space."'45
Many school officials believe they have no room for discretionary
judgment. "[Harassment is] something you have to address legally," a
principal in Taunton, Massachusetts stated.46 "If you don't do some-
thing, then a child's civil rights have been violated and there are legal
repercussions," said Joseph O'Sullivan, the president of the Brockton
teachers' union.47 "Civil rights has no age limit on it, whether it's a 5-
year-old or a 15-year-old or a 20-year-old," agreed a principal in Eas-
ton, Massachusetts; all such complaints must be taken seriously.48
"Teachers are mandated reporters .... That's the standard that you
have," according to O'Sullivan, "You have a policy, you have to follow
the policy, and we do."'49 As Basan Nembirkow, the Brockton super-
intendent explained, "Our procedures created the situation where
[sexual harassment] was the only block you could check." 50
Two themes emerge from these comments. First, law is a necessary
and appropriate response to serious social problems. It is not for
petty, personal matters. Second, law not only specifies impermissible
behaviors, but also identifies a range of legitimate and even required
42. Tracy Jan & Kathleen Burge, Case vs. Brockton Boy Stuns Officials, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
9, 2006, at B1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Maria Papadopoulos, Brockton Boy's Ability to Sexually Harass Girl Questioned, ENTER-
PRISE (Brockton), Feb. 8, 2006 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://enterprise.
southofboston.com/articles/2006/02/O8/news/news/newsO2.txt.
47. Papadopoulos & Downing, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Papadopoulos, supra note 46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Papadopoulos & Downing, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Jan, supra note 3 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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responses to the proscribed conduct. Both the officials involved and
some critics invoked this sense of law as a set of shared aspirations
and recipes for action.
Child-to-child harassment is part of a serious "pandemic of sexual
violence" in elementary and secondary schools, according to Nan
Stein, senior research scientist at the Center for Research on
Women.5' Stein was one of the leaders of the movement to create the
offense of peer sexual harassment; she was also one of the experts
quoted liberally in the media coverage of the case. Since the 1970s,
she has "constructed and disseminated the narratives about peer har-
assment that were taken up by the media, schools, and eventually
courts. ' 52 From this perspective of peer sexual harassment as a social
problem, the law has responded appropriately by mandating locally
enacted antiharassment policies to control the injuries regularly in-
flicted on school children.53 Officials must now take it seriously:
"School systems, businesses, churches and other institutions-if they
know what's good for them-don't brush off allegations of harass-
ment. '54 Stein added in an interview, however, that zero tolerance is
not the right approach.55 Officials must follow rules once enacted, but
within reason. In this case, Brockton failed to follow its own defini-
51. Nan Stein, A Rising Pandemic of Sexual Violence in Elementary and Secondary Schools:
Locating a Secret Problem, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 33 (2005) (illustrating Stein's convic-
tion about the existence of a pandemic of child-to-child sexual harassment).
52. Short, supra note 40, at 42.
53. The actual history of the law on harassment is not as strong as the voices in Brockton seem
to suggest. Legal construction of this heretofore normal, if undesired, behavior was transformed
through a series of cases. Following Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, in which the
Supreme Court held that schools could be sued for monetary damages if they ignored sexual
harassment, many states began requiring schools to create sexual harassment policies. 503 U.S.
60 (1992). However, Franklin was a case of adult school employees harassing a minor student;
the analogy to peer harassment was not entirely clear. Short, supra note 40, at 38. Although
Davis ruled that "a private damages action may lie against the school board in cases of student-
on-student harassment," the Court, over the vociferous dissent of four Justices, set a high bar so
that this action would apply "only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference
to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). The difference must be "so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit." Id.
Despite the Court's rather strong language, many states, Massachusetts included, required all
school systems to prohibit sexual harassment. The school systems could design their own com-
plaint and sanctioning policies to comply with this high standard. Justice Kennedy's dissent pre-
dicted, however, that "[a]fter today, Johnny will find that the routine problems of adolescence
are to be resolved by invoking a federal right to demand assignment to a desk two rows away."
Id. at 686 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
54. Hancock, supra note 34 ("[A]t least those in charge took the incident seriously.... [A]t
least folks were paying attention. And that's a good thing.").
55. Telephone Interview with Nan Stein, Senior Research Scientist, Ctr. for Research on
Women, in Wellesley, Mass. (Mar. 15, 2006); see also Nan Stein, Bullying or Sexual Harassment?
The Missing Discourse of Rights in an Era of Zero Tolerance, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 783 (2003).
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tions and procedures, which called for suspension when there is "re-
peated, unwanted, or unwelcome verbalism or behaviors of a [sexual]
nature."5 6 This was not even a case of sexual harassment, Stein as-
serted, so the invocation of the law "was outrageous. '57 Moreover, no
one has suggested sexuality was involved in the six-year-old's decision
to touch his classmate's back.58 In addition, Stein added that "nobody
knows whether this was the first or one hundredth incident with this
child, irrespective of whether it was sexual in nature. '59
Stein's interpretation was echoed by others who were less active
and less professionally allied with the issue of sexual violence among
children. 60 These nonprofessional actors also argued, however, that
invoking sexual harassment for disciplinary issues that are normal as-
pects of child development only "trivializes actual sexual harass-
ment. '61 Harassment is real, they agreed, and "it should not be
brushed off,"62 but this was not a case the law was meant to address.
Thus, both the officials who believe they are following legal rules gov-
erning sexual harassment, and people who find the sexual harassment
law necessary but inapplicable here, agree that the law is a set of gov-
erning substantive and procedural standards.
B. "Punishable by Emasculation ' 63
Some observers thought the Brockton school department's actions
were necessary; others saw them as an unfortunate overreaction and a
misinterpretation of a serious social problem and reasonable public
law. Some members of the public, however, saw this as just another
instance of the overwhelming power of "loony liberal[s]" 64 who pray
"at the altars of political correctness. '65 "Not even childhood is safe
from excessive incriminations of the politically correct kind" whose
"invasion into our lives is appalling," according to the student newspa-
56. Editorial, 6-Year-Old Predator? Brockton Harassment Charge Defies Common Sense,
TELEGRAM & GAZETVE (Worcester), Feb. 10, 2006, at A1O (emphasis added) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57. Telephone Interview with Nan Stein, supra note 55.
58. Derek Rose, No Kiddin'! Boy, 6, in Sex Flap, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 10, 2006, at 15
(quoting Christopher Murray about a six-year-old not having the capacity to be sexually
gratified).
59. Telephone Interview with Nan Stein, supra note 55.
60. See, e.g., Editorial, 6-Year-Old Predator?, supra note 56.
61. Id.
62. Papadopoulos, supra note 46.
63. Editorial, It's Tough Being a Boy, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. 11, 2006, at 10b.
64. Don't Shake Hands with Brockton School Principal Diane Gosselin, supra note 4.
65. Editorial, It's Tough Being a Boy, supra note 63.
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per at the University of Texas at Arlington.66 Feminists, the argument
goes, undermine classrooms and families and emasculate boys with
their zero tolerance politics. This voice was not prominent on news
pages in the Boston Globe, but it did appear in letters to the editors in
Boston newspapers and elsewhere, as well as on weblogs. In addition,
the Brockton superintendent of schools had reportedly been receiving
"hate mail from all over the country," 67 perhaps from those who saw
him as part of this conspiracy of feminist political correctness.
Again, two themes emerge in the interpretations that saw the inci-
dent as part of a national political struggle. First, the law has become
a tool of feminists preoccupied with gender and sexuality. Second,
sexual harassment laws have become an uncontrollable weapon that
can be used to harass good people, as well as undermine important
policies and rights. Officious bureaucrats and litigious citizens are dif-
ferent sides of the same unfortunate power struggle. According to
these interpretations, the Brockton story is more about power than
law.
Gender and sexuality play several roles in the stories. Some per-
ceived the incident as the logical outcome of the power of feminists to
colonize and reinterpret ordinary social relations through their harp-
ing about gender inequality. See what they have wrought! These re-
sponses were not entirely wrong. Many of these harassment policies
were adopted with the advice and support of professional education
managers and organizations spurred by an organized campaign that
had been ongoing since the 1970s.6 8
Despite the vehemence of the claims, they were considerably muted
in comparison to what had erupted in 1996, when a ten-year-old in
Lexington, North Carolina was suspended for kissing a young girl in
school.69 At that time, the major media were mobilized, with TV
news and public affairs programming carrying interviews with propo-
nents of various positions in organized debates. The theme of this
political interpretation was the same in 1996 as it was in 2006:
66. Cole Dowden, Kindergartners Gone Wild, SHORTHORN, Feb. 14, 2006.
67. Jan, supra note 3.
68. Short, supra note 40, at 41-51.
69. According to several of the stories, this type of incident had been reported in the news
before. Editorial, Sex at 6?: First-Grader Punished for Sexual Harassment, TULSA WORLD, Feb.
13, 2006, at A15 ("It has happened before. A New York second-grader was suspended in 1996
for kissing a girl and ripping a button off her skirt. The boy said he got the idea from his favorite
book, Corduroy, about a bear with a missing button."); see also Norimitsu Onishi, Harassment in
2d Grade? Queens Kisser Is Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at Al (reporting that later in
the year, "a 6-year-old was suspended for kissing a classmate on the cheek"); Nancy Weil, Read
Their Lips: No Kissing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at 1; Boy Banned for Kissing
Gets Star Treatment, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sidney, Austl.), Sept. 26, 1996, at P4.
648 [Vol. 56:639
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"[L]ook at what you feminists have done" to little children. 70 Unfor-
tunately, according to a child psychiatrist in Philadelphia, "[It's] an
approach to answer 20,000 years of the degradation of women by find-
ing some 42-pound little fellow to take the fall for it."' t According to
an editorial in the Quincy, Massachusetts Patriot Ledger, little girls are
being mobilized by their politically correct parents; no little girl would
know to claim sexual harassment. 72 Sexual harassment may be serious
but it protects girls, not boys, some writers claimed; if a little boy were
touched by a little girl, "it would be passed off."'73
Prominent in the Associated Press report that was carried across
the nation was the description of Mrs. Dorinvil, referring to her as a
"stay-at-home mom. '74 In addition, the newspapers reported that this
"stay-at-home mother" was "rais[ing] her only child in the conserva-
tive moral tradition of Haitian evangelicalism. ' 75 She and her hus-
band, "a school bus driver in Boston, do not let [their son] watch
secular television and have signed up for cable so he can watch relig-
ious cartoons. ' 76 One message conveyed by this framing of Mrs.
Dorinvil emphasized the disabling effect of the power of the dominant
political culture. A religious stay-at-home mother-and a statistical
minority-who has more time to devote to her child than working
mothers cannot protect her child from the overwhelming power of the
state.
The fact that the boy did not watch mainstream conventional televi-
sion provided additional silage for those who saw the incident as a
sign of the corruption of the public culture; the law was not a product
of a feminist conspiracy, but of a sexualized media. Many of those
who tried to explain what had happened-rather than evaluate it-
linked the social problem of sexual harassment to the sexual satura-
tion of popular culture by the media. 77 In the first construction, the
70. Telephone Interview with Nan Stein, supra note 55: see also Dvorak Uncensored, http://
www.dvorak.org/blog/?p=4183 (Feb. 9, 2006, 02:02 EST) (depicting a cartoon of Jack and Jill).
71. Rose, supra note 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Editorial, Brockton School's Reaction Was Overkill, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy), Feb. 14,
2006, at 18.
73. Id. ("If a male child told a teacher that a female child touched him, it would be passed off;
but because it was a female student, it gets investigated.").
74. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 58.
75. Ranalli & Mishra, supra note 2.
76. Id.
77. E.g., Editorial, Allow Room for Innocence, CALGARY HERALD, Feb. 11, 2006, at A28;
Posting of Joel Mark to http://www.worldmagblog.com/blog/archives/022494.html (Feb. 9, 2006,
08:22 EST) ("Our culture protects and celebrates lewd and egregious forms of sexual chaos of all
sorts in public, in print, in movies, on TV, in debate, in Super Bowl commercials, on cable, in
internet, and on and on. We put real perverts on parade and are outraged if they are called
perverts.").
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incident was a result of the power of feminist groups to colonize the
law. In this second rendering, however, the incident was a conse-
quence of the power of the media to suffuse our lives with sexuality.
In both cases, it was about power. Indeed, Mrs. Dorinvil seemed to
experience it as a matter of unjust power. No one contacted her about
the incident, she reported, until "she was instructed to pick her son up
from school. '78 "When I got there, they had all this paperwork in
front of them," she said, "They said they had already called the district
attorney and school police."'79 From Mrs. Dorinvil's perspective, the
heavy arm of the law had fallen on her unannounced: "I was shocked.
I was crying. I was out of control because I [saw] that this [was] not
fair." 80 She was unable to explain to her son what was happening:
"He doesn't even know what that word 'sexual' is. I don't see how
I'm going to explain it to him .... I can't. He's just too young for
that." 81
This religious, attentive, stay-at-home mother was incapacitated by
the combined power of the school officials, the threat of the police,
the referral to the district attorney, and in the critics' accounts, the
power of feminists and the media. Managing to keep the media at
bay, she was unable to keep the law from her doorstep. In this situa-
tion, she did what a lot of people do under the circumstances: she
found a way of resisting the bureaucratic procedures by following
them literally.8 2 Following the demand to remove her son from
school, she did not let him return. The school expected that the child
would of course return following the three-day suspension. By insist-
ing that the boy be moved to another school to avoid stigmatization,
she required the school to fully embrace its own interpretation that
the case was serious enough to warrant suspension and referral to the
district attorney. Further, by picking up on the school's literal use of
policy, she directly challenged the school administration's prerogative
to determine a child's placement.
Mrs. Dorinvil's resistance exposed to public view the power institu-
tionalized in the school bureaucracy-a routinized, complacent au-
thority that conventional procedures did not seem to restrain or
moderate. Whether it was an example, as some commentators
claimed, of "cover your ass bureaucrats" 83 trying to hide behind badly
78. Crimaldi & Ross, supra note 37.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Ranalli & Mishra, supra note 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to
Legal Authority, 108 AM. J. Soc. 1328 (2003).
83. See Editorial, Lessons Needed in Common Sense, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 9, 2006, at 34.
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drawn policies, or genuine concern about harm to the little girl, they
sacrificed another child. His stay-at-home mother had the time, it
seems, to resist. Her resistance was unexpected and almost inconceiv-
able, thus prompting the scandal. Had this happened in Newton, Wel-
lesley, Weston, or Lexington-communities with considerably more
affluent and professional populations than the blue collar, primarily
black population of Brockton-the young boy's family would have ar-
rived at the school with lawyer in tow. The case would have been
resolved on the spot without public notice, and it is unlikely that the
child would have been suspended or assigned to another classroom.
C. "Boy's Parents Hire Lawyer" 84
A third line of interpretation involves the more familiar scenario in
which a litigant retains counsel to regain rights threatened by an-
other-the bread and butter of legal practice. In this account, we fo-
cus on the fact that once the story broke in the news, the Dorinvils did
hire an attorney. "I want to stand to defend my rights," Mrs. Dorinvil
said.85 Because she hired an attorney, she was able to secure her
child's transfer to another school, receive an apology from the school
system, and instigate a review of the school's policy that led to formal
changes. A month after the original incident, again with the help of
her attorney, Mrs. Dorinvil obtained court-ordered access to her son's
full school record and all of the investigations of the incident to find
out what actually happened. 86 This legal engagement proved once
again that we no longer live in "the nonlitigious days of Dick and
Jane. '8 7 If the law is not seen as an absolute command as in the first
interpretation, nor as a matter of brute political power as in the sec-
ond set of interpretations, then in this third line of analysis, litigation
is at least an option. There is room for maneuvering, engagement,
and discretion all along the way. Viewed as a tactical resource, the
law need not be invoked categorically.
Many of the teachers, principals, and school officials contacted by
the media described alternatives that the Brockton schools could have
pursued. Joan Vodoklys, principal of the McCarthy Elementary
school in Framingham, Massachusetts, suggested that "[i]nstead of
suspension ... she would have first contacted the parents, and then
would have asked a social worker or counselor to speak with the boy
84. Jan, supra note 3.
85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Papadopoulos, supra note 5.
87. Editorial, Sex at 6?, supra note 69.
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about his intentions."8 8 "Giving the boy (and maybe the girl if she
started it) some 'time-out' in the classroom might have been enough,"
as some reports have suggested. 89 A New York City school official
said that the department does deal with sexual harassment by young-
sters, but a typical punishment would not involve suspension: "It does
happen, kids get curious," but "[u]sually, the kids get put into counsel-
ing."90 The Boston Herald suggested that "a stern lecture and a meet-
ing between the teacher, the principal and the boy's parents" were all
that was necessary, "not a three-day suspension, a referral of 'evi-
dence' to the DA and a permanent mark on [that] little boy's reputa-
tion."91 The Tulsa World suggested that "a quiet talk with the boy and
maybe a report to the parents would have been sufficient. ' 92 "Rather
than be suspended or branded a potential criminal," one letter to the
Boston Globe recommended, "the child should have been corrected
and counseled as to what constitutes inappropriate touching. '93 A let-
ter to the editor noted, "[A] competent elementary school teacher
could have, and should have, handled the little incident in the class-
room. They are just kids. Bravo to the mother for bringing it all pub-
lic."'94 The principal in another Brockton school said, "Nine times out
of 10 it's about sitting down with them, talking with them, telling them
about respecting each other's personal body .... And nine times out
of 10, you will never see that child again. ' 95 The general consensus
was clear that "talking to this child was all that was needed" 96-by the
teacher, the parents, or perhaps a professional counselor. 97
Believing themselves constrained by the federal and state laws, and
finding that "sexual harassment" was the only applicable category
listed on official forms, the Brockton School suspended the six-year-
old. Without legal representation, Mrs. Dorinvil was unable to influ-
ence or persuade the school to act otherwise; she was unable to mobil-
ize a review process. With legal representation, however, and
88. Jan & Burge, supra note 42.
89. Hancock, supra note 34; accord Editorial, 6-Year-Old Predator?, supra note 56 ("School
officials said a girl in the boy's class told the teacher he had put two fingers inside the waistband
of her pants. His mother said he told her he touched the girl's blouse after she touched him.").
90. Rose, supra note 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Editorial, Lessons Needed in Common Sense, supra note 83.
92. Editorial, Sex at 6?, supra note 69.
93. Editorial, Counseling Is What 6-Year-Old Needed, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2006, at A18.
94. Editorial, School Wrong on Boy, 6, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy), Feb. 18, 2006, at 14.
95. Papadopoulos & Downing, supra note 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Frances Hoeg, the principal at Duval Elementary School).
96. Editorial, Brockton 6-Year-Old, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy), Feb. 17, 2006, at 6.
97. Jean Porrazzo, Most Important Lessons Begin at Home, ENTERPRISE (Brockton), Feb. 12,
2006, available at http://enterprise.southofboston.com/articles/2006/02/12/news/news/newsO5.txt;
see also Editorial, 6-Year-Old Predator?, supra note 56.
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certainly with media coverage, the legal mandate became considerably
less rigid. Alternatives were considered and negotiations ensued. The
school system became less confident of its own action, reconsidered its
legal obligations, reinterpreted the legal mandate, and finally apolo-
gized to the Dorinvil family. Just as importantly, the system formally
changed its policy, as well as the forms for referring incidents of abuse
between children to higher authorities. With this apology and the pol-
icy revision, the school officials demonstrated their discretionary,
rather than mandatory, authority. Rather than a fixed, inviolate set of
commands, the school system's response to Mrs. Dorinvil's attorney
evinced an understanding of public policy as malleable, adaptable, and
the product of engagement.
III. LOCATING THE RULE OF LAW IN CONVENTIONAL
(HEGEMONIC) LEGALITY
Thus far I have displayed at least three interpretations of law that
circulated in public discourse in response to the Brockton case. None
of these accounts-whether the conception of law as (1) a set of pro-
cedures and rules of play that offer accessible and participatory deci-
sionmaking, (2) a transcendent good that defers as it both confines
and embodies coercive force, or (3) a tool of power that subordinates
as it promises justice-is able to sustain, by itself, the pervasive defer-
ence to law that saturates American society. Let me be clear that I am
not disagreeing with colleagues who locate deference to law in proce-
dures or in conceptions of rights and legitimacy. But by themselves,
they are not sufficient. A true description of how law lives and sur-
vives as a taken-for-granted set of practices is needed to encompass
this deeper understanding.
As an ensemble, rather than discrete distinguishable threads, the
collection of legal narratives works to constitute popular legal con-
sciousness, or what we might call the rule of law. Any particular expe-
rience can fit within the diversity of the whole. Here, legality is
understood to be both a set of ahistorical, universal principles and a
set of pragmatic opportunities and strategies. It sustains itself, as heg-
emonic, because any singular account conceals the social organization
of law by effacing the connections between the concrete particular
and the transcendent general.98 It is both beyond the mess of mun-
98. Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Sig-
nificance of Knowing That the "Haves" Come out Ahead, in IN LITIOATION: DO THE "HAVES"
STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 273 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003); see also Ewick &
Silbey, supra note 82; Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales:
Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & Soc'y REV. 197 (1995). For a more elaborate argu-
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dane reality and securely located within daily affairs. To state the
matter differently, legality is much weaker and more vulnerable where
it is more singularly conceived. If legality were ideologically consis-
tent, as our Platonic heritage has for so long urged, it would be quite
fragile. For instance, if the only thing people knew about the law was
its profane face of crafty lawyers and media-reported tort cases, it
would be difficult to sustain the support necessary for legal authority.
The aspiration for disinterested, procedurally regular decisionmaking
serves to balance that cynical account, feeding the image of lady jus-
tice-the sacred, awesome, transcendent legality. However, a tran-
scendent, reified law, unleavened by familiarity (and even the
cynicism familiarity breeds), would in time become irrelevant. Law
that becomes entirely procedural and without substance becomes le-
galistic.99 Either way-as solely god or as empty game-it would
eventually self-destruct. Instead, legality is strengthened by the oppo-
sitions that exist within and among the narratives.
The Brockton case is both usual and unusual, banal and extraordi-
nary. It is a very common example of what constitutes routine compli-
ance-efforts to organize social relations in accord with legal
requirements. As a relatively minor, street-level form of law enforce-
ment, it is merely one of thousands-indeed, millions-of such actions
that take place every day and constitute daily life in America. On the
other hand, it is unusual in that it is an incident that moved several
steps along the litigation process, from a perceived injurious event
(the boy's hand on his classmate's back) through the stages of "nam-
ing, blaming and claiming." 100 Although almost any social transaction
could, in theory, become a matter of dispute and lead to legal claims,
few in fact do.10' Even when people hire an attorney and then file
ment, see PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SIL3EY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
99. Lawrence M. Friedman, On Legalistic Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber, 1966 Wis. L.
REV. 148.
100. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transforma-
tion of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-1981).
101. Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCES 151 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Marc Galanter, Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Herbert M. Kritzer, Study-
ing Disputes: Learning from the CLRP Experience, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 503 (1980-1981);
Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States of America: Blaming and
Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & Soc'Y 400 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer, W.A. Bogart & Neil
Vidmar, The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the
United States, 25 LAW & Soc'y REV. 499 (1991); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-1981);
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suit, as Mrs. Dorinvil did, few cases actually go to trial. But Mrs.
Dorinvil did get her hearing. 02
When we speak of a rule of law, it is because most of legality lies
submerged within the taken-for-granted expectations of mundane life.
We might imagine this legality, this rule of law, as an iceberg whose
mass lies beneath the articulated events of ordinary social life. Rather
than contested and choreographed in the rare trial, legality "rules"
everyday life because its constructions are mostly uncontested and ha-
bitual. Law's constructions and mediations have been gradually sedi-
mented and built up throughout the routines of daily living, just as
each day of precipitation adds to the mass of the iceberg, some float-
ing visibly above the waterline, the larger mass invisible below. Ac-
tions that become practices, habits, and then conventions help us to go
through life in more or less unproblematic ways, without having to
think about each step we take as we drive cars, cross streets, pay for
groceries, or take our children to school. The conventions that be-
come law are not different, helping to organize social relations, often
without having to invoke, display, or wield the law's elaborate and
intricate processes-especially its ultimate, physical force.
Of course, this normative and legal sedimentation is never com-
plete; we do not always stay within the boundaries of legally sanc-
tioned expectations, and the reach of law is always disputed. Thus,
much of the visible iceberg of legality is about what to do in the event
of breach; some of those messes or matters of concern lead to litiga-
tion, and some even to trials. Importantly, however, these visible legal
battles are the exceptions to the law's more routine dominance.
The law is a durable and powerful human institution because it in-
visibly suffuses our everyday life. As we go about our daily lives, we
rarely sense the presence of the law. Although law operates as a
means for making things public and mediating matters of concern,
most of the time it does so without fanfare, without contest, and with-
out notice. We pay our bills because they are due; we respect our
neighbors' property because it is theirs. We drive on a particular side
of the road because it is prudent; we register our motor vehicles and
stop at red lights. We rarely consider the collective judgments and
procedures through which we have defined "coming due," "their
property," "prudent driving," or why automobiles must be registered
Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 849 (1980-1981); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983); Deborah R. Hensler, Why We Don't Know More About the Civil
Justice System-And What We Could Do About It, USC L. MAG., Fall 1994.
102. Papadopoulos, supra note 5.
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and why traffic stops at red lights. If we trace the source of these
expectations and meanings to some legal institution or practice, the
origin is so far away in time and place that the matters of concern and
circumstances of invention have been long forgotten. As a result of
this distance, sales contracts, property, and traffic rules seem to be
natural and inevitable facts of life.
Legal objects, signs, forms, rules, and decisions are understood,
however, to be a special kind of fact-a legal fact. Perhaps we should
collapse the distance between the words "legal" and "fact," using
legalfact to emphasize the procedures of law that are the grounds for
constructing facts. In other words, jurisprudence recognizes at its core
that its truths are created only through its particular processes, and
that the relationship between legalfacts and empirical facts is approxi-
mate at best. 10 3 The habits sustained by law and the interpretations of
social relations underwritten by legal concepts or authorities may also
function as legalfacts.
As naturalized features of modern life, the signs and objects of law
are omnipresent. Through historic as well as contemporary legal deci-
sions that are no longer debated, countless matters of concern have
been resolved, concretized, and objectified-built into the very struc-
tures of ordinary social relations. Every package of food, piece of
clothing, and electrical appliance contains a label that warns us about
its dangers, instructs us about its uses, and tells us whether (and
where) we can complain if something goes wrong. Every time we
park a car, dry clean our clothes, or check our coats, we are informed
about limited liabilities for loss. Newspapers, television, novels, plays,
magazines, and movies are saturated with legal images, while these
very same objects display their claims to copyright.
Although much of the time, legal forms go unnoticed, they are im-
perfectly naturalized. At any moment, the stabilized, historical
legalfact can reappear, perhaps becoming a matter of concern, debate,
challenge, or resistance. Children attend school from ages five
through sixteen in Massachusetts, as the General Laws and conven-
tion have required for the last 150 years. The fact that teachers moni-
tor student interactions for sexual harassment and report such
incidents to authorities, however, has not yet become habituated or
uncontested, despite the legal mandate. Here, the visible iceberg of
legality cracks and hits a passing ship. Most of the time, however,
legal regulation goes without consideration or challenge.
103. See BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NET-
WORK-THEORY (2005) (providing an extended discussion of the making of social facts, including
scientific facts).
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IV. ONE FINAL ILLUSTRATION
My favorite illustration of this deeply sedimented, hegemonic law
concerns the familiar practice in Chicago, Boston, New York, and
some other northern cities, of placing an old chair, traffic cone, milk
crate, or other noticeable object in a recently shoveled parking spot
on a snow-filled public street. "Before snowfalls, a parking space be-
longs to the one who occupies it: you leave it, you lose it. In winter-
time Chicago, however," writes Fred McChesney in an economic
analysis of this practice and of the city's response to it, "excavating
one's car changes the system of property rights.' 04 Professor Richard
Epstein refers to this practice as "dibs": t0 5 "[It] reduces available
parking spaces ... it also rewards those who have put the effort into
the job. Would the shovelers spend all that time if they only got to use
the space just once?"'1 6 In this way, Esptein further argues, "[Dibs
provides] a trade-off not dissimilar to that found in the patent and
copyright law. The initial digger of the spot is given a limited monop-
oly for its use."'01 7 Although questions of duration of the monopoly
preoccupy the economic analysis, my interest lies in the legality of the
practice, in the sense I have been using the term, as a discourse of law.
Like those who hire lawyers to protect their rights or negotiate a
child's return to school, McChesney and Epstein express a pragmatic
sense of law as a negotiated contest rather than a transcendent good.
Dibs on parking spots enact a form of justice sustained by supply
and demand, utility and exchange. At the same time, however, the
practice of placing an old chair on a public street to hold a parking
spot evokes a foundational conception of ownership and labor, which
cannot be practiced or interpreted without legal concepts and cogni-
tions, as our economic and legal commentators evidence. The chair
placed in a parking spot on a public street is understood to endow the
chair's owner with use rights in the space. This understanding is not
limited to our esteemed colleagues. My point is that this practice can-
not be interpreted by those who engage in or observe it without in-
voking legal concepts and meanings. It is unintelligible without
notions of property and trespass. But unlike contracts, copyrights,
traffic signs, or bills of sale, which are standard markers of legality,
this chair in the snow is not the direct and intentional product of pro-
104. Fred S. McChesney, Snow Jobs, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, Oct. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/columns/mcchesneysnow.html.
105. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S515, S528 (2002).
106. Richard Epstein, Parking and Property, U. CHI. MAG., Apr. 2003, at 42.
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fessional legal work. Instead, we might view these chairs as residue of
that formal legal practice. Rather than a piece of professionalized
law, this is a visual image of the law from the bottom up and from
outside legal institutions. The chair in the shoveled-out parking spot
signals to the neighborhood, or any passerby, a type of ownership. In
claiming ownership, that chair often elicits the same sorts of deference
and respect accorded more conventional types of property. Other
drivers park elsewhere. Similarly, the violation or transgression of
this property claim by removing the chair and parking in the spot may
lead to conflicts and disputes more commonly associated with prop-
erty as formally defined by the legal system-informal claims of
trespass.
Without naming the doctrinal concepts of constructive or adverse
possession, the person placing the chair in a clearing among mounds
of snow implicitly invokes conventional and historic justifications for
property on the basis of investment and labor, the same arguments
that underwrote the emergence of liberal law in the seventeenth cen-
tury. The heavy labor of shoveling out the mounds of snow is under-
stood to endow the chairs' owners with use rights in those spaces. By
placing a chair in a public parking place, the formal legal idea of pri-
vate property is appropriated along with many of the rights associated
with it, such as exclusive use. Yet property here is construed very dif-
ferently than its doctrinal sense demands or would allow. Even with-
out registered deeds and titles, stamps and seals, the law is absent in
its formal professional sense, but it is continually and morally present
in organizing social relations on a city street around this particular
construction of the automobile, the parking space, and private
property.
The public street has its own "set of procedures, its definition of
freedom and domination, its ways of bringing together those who are
concerned .. .and what concerns them.' 0 8 The legalfacts of public
space, the truth of who owns and who can use this space, for what and
for how long, no longer command unremarked deference. Whether
others defer to or contest the claims to the parking spots, the legalfacts
of property rights, the city's services, and law enforcement now de-
mand collective reconfirmation of their legitimacy.
The Brockton elementary schools, just as the public street with a
milk crate holding dibs, become spaces of civic engagement for those
concerned with children, schools, freedom, sexuality, and the law.
108. Bruno Latour, From Realpolitik to Dingpolitic: Or How to Make Things Public, Intro-
duction to MAKING THINGS PUBLIC: ATMOSPHERES OF DEMOCRACY 14, 31 (Bruno Latour &
Peter Weibel eds., 2005).
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The legalfacts of children's rights, of teachers' obligations, and of pa-
rental authority no longer command uncontested compliance.
Whether others defer to-or challenge-a teacher's report of sexual
harassment, a school system's authority to determine a child's place-
ment, or a parent's desire to shield a child from hostile forces, legality
now demands collective reconfirmation of its status as legalfact. This
is the rule of law enacted and lived every day by Americans.
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